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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2784 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
 v. 
 
 LAMAR BROWN, 
        Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Criminal No. 02-00083) 
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 18, 2011 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and COWEN, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed :  September 21, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Lamar Brown appeals pro se from an order dismissing his motion pursuant to 
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).  Because no 
2 
 
substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
In 2003, Brown was convicted of unlawful possession of controlled substances 
with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment.  He filed an appeal, which was dismissed by this Court at Brown’s 
request.  C.A. No. 03-2882. 
 In 2004, Brown filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2555, 
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.  Brown argued that counsel failed to 
adequately support the pretrial suppression motions with facts that would have allegedly 
resulted in the District Court’s granting his request for a hearing pursuant to Franks v. 
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).1
                                                 
1 Brown’s motion to suppress argued that the confidential informant on which the 
officers had relied upon to obtain the search warrant was lying.  He requested a Franks 
hearing to establish whether the warrant was defective for containing false information.   
 
The Supreme Court held in Franks that “where the defendant makes a substantial 
preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless 
disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the 
allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth 
Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request.”  438 U.S. at 155-
56. 
 
  After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the District 
Court denied the motion as meritless.  This Court granted a certificate of appealability, 
and in 2008 affirmed the decision of the District Court.  See United States v. Brown, 283 
F. App’x 63 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 In 2009, Brown filed a Rule 60(b) motion, which the District Court dismissed for  
lack of jurisdiction.2
Additionally, Brown cannot show “through clear, unequivocal and convincing 
evidence” that there was “(1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer of the court; (3) 
which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in fact deceives the court,” to prevail under 
Hazel-Atlas.  See Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2005).  In 
affirming the District Court’s denial of his § 2255 motion, this Court determined that 
“Brown still could not show that the officers lied intentionally [and] . . . there [was] no 
  In May 2011, Brown filed a “Hazel-Atlas Action” and 
accompanying affidavit, requesting that the District Court reconsider its decision and 
order denying a Franks hearing.  The District Court denied the motion, and Brown 
appeals.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Supreme Court has held, in 
civil cases, that “the inherent power [of a federal court] allows [it] to vacate its own 
judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court.”  Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citing Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 249-50).  
However, this inherent power has not applied to criminal cases.  See United States v. 
Washington, 549 F.3d 905, 912, 917 (3d Cir. 2008) (federal courts do not have inherent 
power “to vacate a judgment procured by fraud in the criminal context”).   
                                                 
2 Brown filed an untimely appeal to this Court, which was dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.  C.A. No. 10-1871.  Brown then filed two motions seeking to reopen the 
time to file an appeal.  The District Court denied the motions and we affirmed.  C.A. No. 
10-3570. 
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indication whatsoever that the officers conspired with the informant to lie.”  283 F. App’x 
at 66.  Therefore, the District Court properly denied Brown’s Hazel-Atlas motion. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order.  
